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Abstract² As modern information systems become increasingly 
business- and safety- critical, it is extremely important to 
improve both the trust that a user places in a system and their 
understanding of the risks associated with making a decision. 
This paper presents the STRAPP framework, a generic 
framework that supports both of these goals through the use of 
personalised provenance reasoning engines and state-of-art risk 
assessment techniques. We present the high-level architecture of 
the framework, and describe the process of systematically 
modelling system provenance with the W3C PROV provenance 
data model. We discuss the business drivers behind the concept 
of personalizing provenance information, and describe the 
STRAPP approach to enabling this through a user-adaptive 
system style. We discuss using data provenance for risk 
management and treatment in order to evaluate risk levels, and 
discuss the use of CORAS to develop a risk reasoning engine 
representing core classes and relationships. Finally, we 
demonstrate the initial implementation of our personalised 
provenance system in the context of the Rolls-Royce Equipment 
Health Management, and discuss its operation, the lessons we 
have learnt through our research and implementation (both 
technical and in business), and our future plans for this project. 
Keywords²provenance,  risk, trust, web services 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
As real-world information systems increasingly require 
users to make business- and safety- critical decisions based 
upon data and analyses that arrive from many distributed and 
heterogeneous sources (both computer systems and human 
users), it is crucial for a user to be able to place trust in system 
outputs and to understand the risk of making decisions based 
upon these outputs.  
Despite this, users are often unaware of the provenance of 
the data upon which they are asked to make a decision ± where 
and who it has come from, what time it was created, based on 
ZKDW LQIRUPDWLRQ DV D UHVXOW RI ZKLFK GHFLVLRQV RU µYDOXH-
DGGHG¶RSHUDWLRQV, and so on. Such information is critical for 
allowing users to make informed decisions, and also for 
facilitating fault-diagnosis of system components (software, 
hardware, and human). Much research has been carried out on 
various approaches to capturing provenance at source (i.e. at 
WKHµSRLQWRIFUHDWLRQ¶HJ>@DQGWDFNOLQJWKHFKDOOHQJHVLQ
representation for interoperability [3].  However, there is a lack 
of understanding as to how users can exploit provenance data 
WR HQKDQFH WKHLU ZRUN DW WKH µSRLQW RI XVH¶ $ WHFKQRORJ\-
driven approach to mining provenance could cause information 
overload or distrust by users as the information could be 
perceived as irrelevant or unreliable. By recording and 
presenting provenance information in a user-specific and 
context-aware form, and integrating a risk assessment concept 
which increases user awareness of possible risks, a significant 
improvement can be made to the trust that a user places on 
service data, as well as providing invaluable diagnostic 
information to system developers and maintainers. This enables 
users to make confident, informed, and timely decisions. 
In order to address this problem, the STRAPP (trusted 
digital Spaces through Timely Reliable And Personalised 
Provenance) project has been established, funded by Rolls-
Royce, Cybula Ltd, and the UK Technology Strategy Board. 
STRAPP has developed a generic framework to facilitate the 
creation of provenance-based, personalised trusted digital 
spaces for timely and confident decision making, for use in any 
multiple stakeholder domain in which critical decisions are 
made. Specifically, the project is targeting the OSys (a 
subsidiary of Rolls-Royce) Equipment Health Management 
(EHM) system, and a Medical Injury Index (MII) decision-
support system developed by Cybula Ltd. This paper presents 
for the first time an initial implementation of the STRAPP 
system, based on the OSys EHM system, and addresses both 
the challenges faced in implementation, and also the lessons 
learned and future work required to improve the 
implementation further. 
II. THE STRAPP PROJECT 
The objective of the STRAPP project is to enable users to 
place increased trust on data shown by, and decisions made by, 
a system by allowing them to view the provenance of that data 
or decision, presented in a personalised manner (for example, 
based on their role; managers may need to view the provenance 
and risk of a decision at a different level than software 
engineers, etc.) Furthermore, the project aims to provide 
mechanisms to ensure users understand the risks associated 
with data and decision-making. STRAPP consists of three main 
internal components shown in figure 1 ± the presentation 
service, personalization service and data management service. 
These are Web Services which interact with other internal 
components at their back end. 
The STRAPP presentation service is responsible for 
IRUPDWWLQJ DQG GLVSOD\LQJ WKH ILQDO ³YLHZ´ RI WKH 675$33
system (i.e. the information the system wishes to display to the 
user) and is also responsible for taking user input from an 
external component and passing that information (correctly 
formatted) to the appropriate STRAPP internal component. The 
³EDFN HQG´ RI WKH SUHVHQWDWLRQ VHUYLFH FRQVLVWV RI D ³8,
DGDSWHU´DQGD³&RQILJXUDWLRQDGDSWHU´7KHVHFRPSRQHQWVDUH
integrated into the external system. The STRAPP 
personalisation service is responsible for invoking the 
STRAPP provenance model and its reasoning engine, and the 
risk assessment components (discussed in sections 3 and 4).  
These components do not interface with any external 
components, and must retrieve any data they require through 
accessing the STRAPP data management web service.  The 
difference between the personalisation service and the 
presentation service is that the presentation service may invoke 
the personalization service multiple times in the process of 
constructing a finished report. The STRAPP data management 
service is responsible for accessing external data resources on 
behalf of the personalisation service. It functions by taking a 
generic request, formatted in XML by the personalisation 
service and ± through a bespoke data adapter ± converting that 
generic request into a system specific request, and sending this 
to the target external component. On receiving data from a 
component, the data will be converted into a generic XML-
based format and sent back to the personalisation service.  
The major contribution of this work is the personalisation 
service, and the following two sections discuss the role of the 
provenance reasoning model and risk assessment components 
in greater detail. 
III. PERSONALIZED PROVENANCE REASONING MODELS 
In order to support the ability to make correct decisions, 
factors affecting the way the decision maker acts need to be 
considered.  Presentation of provenance data in a way that 
ensures greater objectiveness in the decision making process is 
also required. 
A. Modelling Provenance 
Provenance information requires that the underlying system 
workflow of a target system be systematically modelled.  
Within STRAPP, we have named this workflow and associated 
provenance meta-data the µ&RQILJXUDWLRQ 1HWZRUN¶.  This 
Configuration Network will be unique for each system under 
observation and contains the linking between system personnel, 
processes and documents along with configuration 
management information as a connected directed graph. 
The provenance of an end result of a target system can be 
derived, therefore, by following the complete path through the 
graph from the input data source to the end output.  This 
provenance data will not just contain a list of entities from the 
workflow graph, but additionally will contain provenance 
specific meta-data such as: 
x Versioning information about the software systems. 
x Training data for software systems, for instance data 
used within event detection algorithms. 
x Personnel associated with enacting system processes. 
In order to model the configuration network and associated 
provenance meta-GDWD ZH KDYH EXLOW XSRQ WKH :&¶V 3529
provenance data model standard [4].  This permits a 
formalization of the Configuration Network structure at the 
highest level.  PROV defines the core concepts of Entity, 
Activity, and Agent to represent: documents; processes that act 
on Entities; and a human or software enactor of the Activity.  
The associations between these top-level concepts are 
illustrated in Figure 2.  Furthermore, PROV permits meta-data 
to be attached to this basic structure; examples of this include 
activity start and completion times. 
PROV is in a W3C Working Draft status as of September 
2012.  It must be stated at this point that this paper will not 
show the specific workflow created for the Rolls Royce 
Electronic Health Management decision support system due to 
commercial sensitivities; however, the Configuration Network 
will be discussed in general terms. STRAPP takes advantage of 
a provenance modelling approach to represent and reason about 
the Configuration Network and associated provenance meta-
data.  This modelling builds upon the W&¶V GH-facto 
ontological representation of PROV named PROV-O which is 
GHILQHGXVLQJWKH:&¶V:HE2QWRORJ\/DQJXDJH2:/ A 
strong motivation for adopting this approach rather than an ad-
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Figure 2: PROV Core Structures 
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Figure 1: STRAPP Architecture 
hoc programmatic approach using SQL queries is that the 
modelling approach provides us with a standardized layer of 
normalized data to implement processing algorithms upon. 
This lends itself to the following advantages and abilities: 
x Once the graph is created it can be parsed, modified, 
verified and serialized using standard and well tested tools. 
x The ability to invoke reasoning engines (for instance, Pellet 
[5] or FaCT++ [6]) to detect logical inconsistencies within 
the data and to detect missing elements.  An example of this 
is the ability to detect if the provenance data is missing an 
agent associated with an activity. 
x The ability to infer relationships between entities without 
data being explicitly present in the underlying database.  
This is supported by existing research in Description 
Logics. [5] 
B. Personalizing Provenance Information to the User 
Personalization is becoming one of the key drivers for 
successful deployment and user acceptance of complex 
systems.  At the current time, many large companies have 
adopted personalization technologies as part of the services that 
they offer.  For example, e-commerce sites like Amazon or 
eBay include customer-tailored recommendations to increase 
sales and improve user experiences, search engines use 
personalization features to filter-out irrelevant information, etc. 
In the case of a business system, personalization of information 
is needed in order to prioritize the information which is 
required for a user to complete a particular task according to 
WKHUROHWKDWWKH\DUHFXUUHQWO\IXOILOOLQJ,IWKHXVHU¶VGHFLVLRQ
making activity is to be enhanced through the presentation of 
provenance information, then the personalization process needs 
to apply to the provenance information also. The 
personalization approach taken within the STRAPP project is 
of a user-adaptive system [7] style.  Within this approach we 
define the following four components: 
x User Model - a data structure (model) that contains explicit 
assumptions on the aspects of the user that are relevant to 
the adaptive behavior. 
x Context Model - In STRAPP we will maintain a context 
model presenting information about the provenance 
structure (Configuration Network) and the user roles.  In 
addition the context model will include a risk model to 
enable risk-aware personalization. 
x User model acquisition - Within STRAPP, to start with we 
have considered role-based personalization, which 
considers a collective profile of the people within the same 
role.  The motivation for this is so that user model 
acquisition will be simplified as much as possible. 
x User model application - a module which includes 
algorithms for deciding what information to be shown to the 
user and how, considering the user (context) model. In 
STRAPP, this component will be the prime focus for 
personalization. The motivation for applying the context 
model is to decide what level of provenance detail to 
provide and how. This will also take into account the 
possible risk associated with the 
advice/notification/information provided by the system. 
To provide a generic example for the use of personalization 
when presenting provenance in a decision support system, we 
can describe a generically applicable scenario; it would contain 
both an Analyst and a Support Engineer role. The requirements 
for provenance information between these two roles and the 
presentation of this information (e.g. the level of detail) would 
be quite different and thus require different information to be 
presented from the context model.  A manager will want to see 
more information about the impact on business, in a 
summarized format on a single page.  They will probably be 
ad-hoc users who do not want to learn how to navigate the 
system, they just want to get to data on their first click.  On the 
other hand, a support engineer user would need a far more in 
depth look at detail, but is possibly still an ad-hoc user. The 
Analyst role would require the presentation of the chain of 
information (Entities and Activities) that led up to the end 
decision along with associated risk information.  The Support 
Engineer's role would involve the task of determining why a 
false positive decision was made and to 'debug' the workflow.  
The Support Engineer would, therefore, require provenance 
information relating to the following: 
x Configuration management and version control for datasets 
and training data associated with software agents which 
enact the activities within the workflow. 
x Error and transaction logs associated with software agents. 
x Verification and validation processes associated with 
software agents. 
Whilst the Context Model would be expected to contain the 
graph representing the whole configuration network it is the 
role of the User Model Application to present a view of this 
model relevant to the user's role and current task. The 
underpinning assumption is that the way information is 
SUHVHQWHG DQG WKH XVHU H[SHULHQFH KDYH LPSDFW RQ WKH XVHU¶V
WUXVW LQ PDNLQJ WKH GHFLVLRQ VXSSRUW LQIRUPDWLRQ µDFWLRQDEOH¶
from the specific context. 
IV. RISK 
Risk is often characterized by reference to potential events 
(combination of potential threats and vulnerabilities) and 
consequences (relates to potential impact), or a combination of 
WKHVH ,Q WKH FRQWH[W RI 675$33 ZH GHILQH µULVN¶ DV WKH
µOLNHOLKRRG¶ RI DQ µXQZDQWHG LQFLGHQW¶ DQG LWV µFRQVHTXHQFH¶
where: 
x Likelihood is the probability of something occurring. 
x An unwanted incident is an event that directly or indirectly 
harms or reduces the value of an asset; an asset in this 
context can be something physical or conceptual to which a 
party assigns value to and for which the party desires to 
protect. 
x The consequence is the impact of an unwanted incident on 
an asset in terms of the harm or a reduction in the value of 
the asset. 
In order to assess the risk associated with making critical, 
high-value decisions based on evidence presented by a system, 
it is essential to know how the data was derived, processed and 
transformed. A traditional approach to understanding risk is 
through the process of risk assessment using a range of 
different methodologies and methods. For example, Fault Tree 
Analysis is a technique based on deductive logic where 
undesirable events are first defined and causal relationships of 
the failures leading to that event are then identified. In contrast, 
the approach adopted in STRAPP consists of using provenance 
for risk management and treatment; the output of risk 
assessment will then be used to evaluate the level of risk. 
Knowing the provenance of an object can help reduce or 
mitigate its associated risk as it provides evidence for data 
consumers to make informed decisions about its origins and 
transformations. This knowledge is essential to determine 
properties such as quality and integrity, and also for the user to 
assess the risk of using the data and the services that derived it. 
However, there may be different levels of risk requiring 
different levels of advice using different types of provenance. 
A. Types of Risk  
Within STRAPP, we have identified five types of risk: 
technical origin risks (e.g. sensors), data-related (e.g. 
integrity), activity-related (e.g. identify symptoms), agent-
related (e.g. technician) and risk of making a final decision.  In 
theory, objects that compose a provenance-aware systems 
expose their provenance and can be modelled using emerging 
W3C standards such as PROV (which provides the three 
objects of Entity, Activity, and Agent are discussed in section 
3). The provenance of each PROV object can be used as the 
basis for calculating risk associated with each object. 
Considering technical origin risks, we are interested in the 
reliability of each technical element and its impact on validity 
of measurements performed. Data-related risk is associated 
with the data transfer from an aircraft to ground and extraction 
of this data. This type of risk looks at data reliability, likelihood 
of losing valuable data, likelihood of data corruption during 
transfer process and transformation of the raw data into 
context-aware information preserving its integrity and initial 
validity. Activity-related risks are the ones which relate to the 
data analysis process, which is based on specific requirements 
associated with particular activity types. Additionally, our 
findings reflect that risks associated with agents must be taken 
into account since agents can be humans and their knowledge 
used to determine whether diagnosis is valid may be crucial in 
this respect.  The overall risk and impact of a notification can 
then be derived by following the complete provenance path 
(Shown in figure 4). With regard to risk of taking a final 
decision we consider an action or a combination of actions with 
respect to the trade-off of possible impacts, defined in terms of 
cost, and risks that may arise. The knowledge of a provenance 
chain and absolute values of risk with regard to these risk types 
increase an overall trust to the system and provides an ability to 
know, understand and manage risks. 
B. Risk reasoning engine 
The purpose of STRAPP is to enhance trust in decision-
making processes based on data provenance and risk 
assessment. A simple approach to help achieve this is by 
creating a risk model based on the data provenance. However, 
this approach may prove to be inefficient in tackling issues 
such as large-scale evolutionary changes, temporal 
information, querying and inference, and user context. To 
address the limitations of a standard risk assessment and enable 
the above issues, a reasoning engine can be employed. Using 
CORAS (a security risk analysis method, which has a 
customized language for threat and risk modelling) we have 
developed a risk model to represent the main risk classes and 
relationships. The main classes of the model include:  
x Assets 
x Consequences 
x Party 
x Threats 
x Threat Scenarios 
x Treatment 
x Treatment Scenarios 
x Unwanted Incidents 
x Vulnerabilities 
The main relations of the risk model include:  
x harms 
x hasConsequence 
x impacts 
x initiates 
x leadsTo 
x occursWithDefined 
x occursWithLikelihood 
x occursWithUndefined 
x occursWithUndefinedLikelihood 
x treats 
By building a reasoning engine based on the provenance and 
risk models, a platform is created where the data provenance 
and the risk model can efficiently communicate and combine to 
DXJPHQWWKHGHFLVLRQVXSSRUWV\VWHPZKLFKFDQDIIHFWµWUXVW¶ 
V. IMPLEMENTATION 
In order to assess the utility of the personalised provenance 
model described in section 3 in an industrial context, an initial 
implementation has been created that integrates STRAPP 
research with the Rolls-5R\FH ³(+0´ V\VWHP 2QHRI 5ROOV-
Royce's business models in the aviation sector (specifically, 
DLUFUDIWHQJLQHVLVWREHD³7RWDO&DUH´VHUYLFHSURYLGHUWDNLQJ
responsibility for maintenance for a fixed price or guaranteeing 
availability of power or thrust over a given period of time. 
³7RWDO&DUH´ Uelies on Equipment Health Management (EHM) 
systems, where sensor readings are taken from Rolls-Royce 
products and analyzed to monitor usage, life and detect early 
signs of failure. If a problem is found - which in real life is a 
rare occurrence - it is important that timely remedial action is 
started before the problem develops toward an unacceptable 
level. Deciding the appropriate remedial action always involves 
a human who has to rely on the information provided to 
support the decisions made. Critical to this process is 
provenance of the decision support information and a full 
understanding of the risk involved in making a decision. 
The system design is shown in figure 3, and consists of 
three components. Firstly, a database containing anonymised 
Rolls-Royce EHM data was established, using the same 
schema and technology as the real system in order to allow for 
easy integration of STRAPP into the main EHM framework. 
Following this, a series of Web Services (containing the 
provenance reasoning model functionality) were developed and 
deployed on an Apache Tomcat server. This server was then 
replicated in order to improve availability through the use of an 
N-Copy fault-tolerance mechanism. All web service 
invocations are performed through this mechanism - should a 
service time-out or raise an exception, an alternate (identical) 
service is invoked on a different server; this process continues 
until either a response is obtained or all alternates have been 
WULHG 7KLV SURYLGHV EDVLF ³IDLO-RYHU´ IDXOW-tolerance. Finally, 
the STRAPP EHM client itself was created; this is a standalone 
Java application, with a GUI that allows users to interact with 
and visualize the results from the Web Services, which in turn 
mine data from the EHM database. All system components are 
logically separate and can be executed on distributed nodes.  
The STRAPP client implementation is focused on the 
aviation domain of EHM, which monitors aircraft engine data. 
This EHM system includes an ³HOHFWURQLF GLDU\´ ZKLFK
supplements the main EHM processing application.  The diary 
provides the ability to record notes and observations made by 
technicians and engineers about the possible problem events 
they observe.  The EHM system produces a number of data 
trends and diagnostics where the system observes deviation 
from normal behavior.  These deviations are initially inspected 
by the technician who marks up the significant events in the 
diary, before passing them on to the engineer who decides 
which diagnostic alerts to forward to Rolls-Royce and the 
airline customers, who then initiate remedial action.  The EHM 
system along with the technician and engineer form a chain of 
triage for potential events, which helps ensure all genuine 
diagnosed events are suitably alerted, with a minimum of false 
positives.  The EHM system, along with the electronic diary, 
form some of the sources for data mining initiated by the 
STRAPP services.    
The client starts by allowing a user to log-in and select their 
role.  In a production system, the user will already be assigned 
a role and the act of logging will assume the role authorizations 
and privileges. These roles can be one of Technician, Engineer, 
Auditor, or Support Engineer$7HFKQLFLDQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLW\LV
to view data trends and a system diagnosis to identify if they 
require the attention of an engineer; if so, the technician 
UHVROYHV WKH GLDJQRVLV LQWR D QRWLILFDWLRQ $Q (QJLQHHU¶V
responsibility is to view notifications to identify if maintenance 
actions need to be taken; if so, the notification will be resolved 
into an alert. The role of an Auditor is to look at each alert and 
verify the processes, data and documents that were used in its 
production.  The auditing role is similar to that undertaken by 
an auditor in ISO 9000, using the provenance capability to 
ensure EHM processes and systems are operated and built to 
the design intent with inherent traceability.  A Support 
Engineer is similar to an Auditor but assumes a more 
diagnostic role, determining why false positive alerts were 
PDGHDQGµGHEXJJLQJ¶WKHZRUNIORZ 
'HSHQGLQJRQDXVHU¶VUROHLQWKHV\VWHPWKH\UHWULHYHDlist 
of notifications, alerts or diagnoses. The STRAPP framework 
supports each role by providing a personalised view of the 
provenance of each of these entities, and visualizing this 
information on screen in graph format. Through STRAPP 
technology, Technicians can quickly determine what diagnosis 
algorithm was used to identify each symptom that makes up a 
diagnosis; Engineers can view this information in addition to 
information about the technician who generated a notification; 
Auditors can view the entire chain of information that led up to 
the end decision to generate an alert; Support Engineers can 
view all the information that an Auditor can see plus additional 
provenance relating to the software systems that implemented 
the EHM processes (relating to configuration management and 
version control of datasets, error and transaction logs 
associated with software agents, verification and validation 
processes associated with software agents, etc.)  
The client implementation initially provides a user with a 
limited view of the provenance chain appropriate for their role 
(in order to avoid information overload as discussed in section 
one); however, when a node in the displayed graph is double-
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Figure 3: Main STRAPP system design 
 
Figure 4: 675$33&OLHQW³$XGLWRU´YLHZ 
clicked, the STRAPP system streams additional data from the 
EDFNHQG V\VWHP¶V SURYHQDQFH GDWDEDVH to add further 
provenance information about that node to the graph (which 
will itself be represented by further nodes). This allows a user 
to recursively mine the provenance database to a depth of their 
choosing. An example of this is shown in figure 4, which 
shows a screenshot of the STRAPP EHM Demonstrator system 
GLVSOD\LQJ DQ H[SDQGHG SURYHQDQFH JUDSK IRU WKH ³$XGLWRU´
role. When a node is selected, any comments left in the 
provenance for that node are displayed in a pane on the left of 
the screen. Users can dynamically reposition graph nodes on 
screen to aid comprehension if so desired.  
In the current system, a pane has been provided for the 
STRAPP Risk Assessment technology, but this has yet to be 
integrated into EHM. It is envisioned that each node in the 
provenance chain will have an associated risk score, which 
users can view to better understand the risks inherent in the 
decision they need to take, supported by an aggregated score of 
the inherent risks within the elements making up the 
provenance chain.  
VI. LESSONS LEARNT AND FUTURE WORK 
During the course of implementing the STRAPP 
framework and integrating it into Rolls-Royce EHM, a number 
of valuable lessons have been learned, both technical and 
social. The system has revealed a completely new use case 
within EHM, whereby provenance may be used for 
troubleshooting EHM Processes and helping to find where ICT 
infrastructure has failed. Additionally, the system has helped to 
reveal how the various reasoning engines can be used for 
inference, and how Rolls-Royce as a business can take 
advantage of this in risk, personalisation and provenance. 
Furthermore, the process of modelling workflow within the 
constraints of the PROV structure has exposed the requirement 
to provide additional configuration management data from the 
underlying system. In addition to this, the process of modelling 
the roles associated with the workflow has identified the need 
for privacy to be considered when presenting provenance 
information to a user, as it could be used to identify the 
performance of particular individuals. Indirectly, STRAPP has 
been a catalyst to review configuration management in Rolls-
Royce development and in how the company run services; this 
has exposed opportunities for improvements to the benefit of 
the business.  STRAPP can be regarded DVDµSHUVSHFWLYH¶IURP
which to view the current EHM service which is highlighting 
many opportunities for improving current practice. 
In terms of future work, there is a great deal that can be 
done to further refine and ± importantly ± evaluate the 
effectiveness of the STRAPP system. We are currently 
organizing a series of user workshops to gain feedback from 
the Rolls-Royce EHM workforce in order to identify 
weaknesses and strengths of the system; this feedback will be 
used to inform a further round of development. We are also 
working to integrate our risk assessment technology into the 
demonstrator, with a goal of allowing the system to calculate a 
risk score for each node within a provenance chain, as well as 
the overall risk of the data and any subsequent decisions. 
Additional work will also be performed to assess the scalability 
of the scheme and refine its overall performance, and stress 
testing will be performed on a larger EHM dataset. Work will 
also continue on the application of STRAPP to the Cybula MII 
system in order to assess the effectiveness and utility of 
STRAPP in the health domain. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present the STRAPP framework, which 
seeks to combine the reasoning engine of a provenance model 
and a risk assessment model together with personalization to 
improve the trust that users can place in a business information 
system. We describe the high-level architecture of the 
framework, and describe the process of systematically 
PRGHOOLQJDV\VWHP¶V³&RQILJXUDWLRQ1HWZRUN´ZLWKWKH:&
PROV provenance data model standard using a reasoning 
engine. We go on to discuss the business drivers behind the 
concept of personalizing provenance information, and discuss 
the STRAPP approach to enabling this through a user-adaptive 
system style. We then discuss the important of risk assessment, 
and the approach in STRAPP of using provenance for risk 
management and treatment in order to evaluate risk levels. We 
identify three types of risk, and discuss the use of CORAS to 
develop a risk model to represent main classes and 
relationships. By building data provenance and risk assessment 
models and using the reasoning engine over these models, we 
create a platform where data provenance and risk can 
efficiently communicate to augment decision support systems. 
Finally, we demonstrate the initial implementation of our 
personalised provenance reasoning system in the context of the 
Rolls-Royce Equipment Health Management system, and 
discuss its operation, the lessons we have learnt through our 
research and implementation (both technical and in business), 
and our future plans for this project. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The STRAPP project (Trusted Digital Spaces through Timely 
Reliable and Personalised Provenance) is funded by the UK 
Technology Strategy Board (grant reference 1926-19253), 
Rolls-Royce plc, Osys Ltd, Cybula Ltd, and the UK 
Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council 
Knowledge Secondment Scheme. Their support is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
REFERENCES 
 >@'%DUVHJKLDQ HW DO ³:RUNIORZV DQG H[WHQVLRQV WR WKH .HSOHU VFLHQWLILF
ZRUNIORZV\VWHPWRVXSSRUWHQYLURQPHQWDOVHQVRUGDWDDFFHVVDQGDQDO\VLV´LQ
Ecological Informatics, pp. 42-50, Volume 5, 2010.  
[2] D. Hull, K. Wolstencroft, R. Stevens, C. Goble, M. Pocock, P. Li, and T. 
2LQQ ³7DYHUQD D WRRO IRU EXLOGLQJ DQG UXQQLQJ ZRUNIORZV RI VHUYLFHV´
Nucleic Acids Research, vol. 34, iss. Web Server issue, pp. 729-732, 2006. 
>@/0RUHDXHWDO³7KH2SHQ3URYHQDQFH0RGHOFRUHVSHFLILFDWLRQY´LQ
Future Generation Computer Systems, 2010. 
[4] K. Belhajjame et al., PROV-O: The PROV Ontology.  W3C Working Draft 
24 July 2012.   http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/ 
[5] E. Sirin, B. Parsia, B. Grau, A. KalyanpXU < .DW] ³3HOOHW $ SUDFWLFDO
OWL-'/UHDVRQHU´ LQ6RIWZDUH(QJLQHHULQJDQGWKH6HPDQWLF:HE9RO
No. 2, pp. 51-53,  June 2007 
>@ ' 7VDUNRY , +RUURFNV ³)D&7 'HVFULSWLRQ /RJLF 5HDVRQHU 6\VWHP
'HVFULSWLRQ´ LQ /HFWXUH 1RWHV LQ &RPSXWHU 6FLHQFH, Volume 4130, pp. 292-
297, 2006  
[7] A. Jameson, ³$GDSWLYH LQWHUIDFHVDQGDJHQWV´ in A. Sears and J.A. Jacko 
(eds.) Human-computer Interaction Handbook, CRC Press, 2008 
 
